















Mathematical Social Sciences, 34 (1997), 249-272.
1 LECAM/GREQAM and
Institut universitaire de France
et Université d’Aix-Marseille 2
Chateau Lafarge
route des Milles
13290 LES MILLES, France
tél.: 33 42 93 08 72




Pavillon J.A. de Sève
Université Laval




We would like to thank Philippe De Donder and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of
this paper. However, we remain responsible for any errors or weaknesses.Abstract
The question addressed in this paper is the order of magnitude of the difference between the Borda rule
and any given social choice function. A social choice function is a mapping that associates a subset of
alternatives to any profile of individual preferences. The Borda rule consists in asking voters to order all
alternatives, knowing that the last one in their ranking will receive a score of zero, the second lowest a
score of 1, the third a score of 2 and so on. These scores are then weighted by the number of voters that
support them to give the Borda score of each alternative. The rule then selects the alternatives with the
highest Borda score. In this paper, a simple measure of the difference between the Borda rule and any
given social choice function is proposed. It is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved by the
social choice function under scrutiny over the Borda score of a Borda winner. More precisely, it is the
minimum of this ratio over all possible profiles of preferences that is used. This "Borda measure" or at
least bounds for this measure is also computed for well known social choice functions.
Résumé
Cet article se penche sur la distance entre la règle de Borda et n’importe quelle autre fonction de choix
social. Ces dernières associent un sous-ensemble d’options possibles à tout profil ou configuration de
préférences individuelles. La règle de Borda consiste à demander aux votants d’ordonner les options
possibles, en leur disant que la dernière dans leur ordre recevra un score nul, l’avant-dernière un score égal
à 1, celle qui vient au troisième pire rang un score égal à 2 et ainsi de suite. Ces scores sont ensuite
pondérés par le nombre de votants qui les supportent pour donner le score de Borda de chaque option. La
règle choisit les options qui ont reçu le score le plus élevé. Dans cet article, une mesure simple de la
différence entre la règle de Borda et n’importe quelle autre fonction de choix social est proposée. Elle est
donnée par le rapport du meilleur score de Borda obtenu par les options que sélectionne la fonction de
choix social considérée sur le score de Borda d’un gagnant de Borda. De façon plus précise, c’est le
minimum de ces rapports, sur l’ensemble des profils de préférences, qui est utilisé. Cette mesure de Borda
ou, à tout le moins, un intervalle pour cette mesure est calculé pour un certain nombre de fonctions de
choix social bien connues.1. Introduction
The controversy between Borda (1784) and Condorcet (1785) is certainly the oldest in social
choice theory. Young (1988, 1995) gives one of the most interesting account of this controversy.
Condorcet advocated the selection of a candidate or alternative that defeats all others in a pair-wise
majority vote, although he was aware of the possibility that a cycle in this majority relation prevent the
use of such a procedure. When this happens, a more elaborate rule must be called to the rescue to break
these cycles. Any social choice function or voting rule that selects a Condorcet winner, when it exists, is
called a Condorcet social choice function.
Borda has been the protagonist of a rule that consists in asking voters to order all alternatives,
knowing that the last one in their ranking will receive a score of zero, the second lowest a score of 1, the
third a score of 2 and so on. These scores are then weighted by the number of voters that support them
to give the Borda score of each alternative. The winners are the alternatives with the highest Borda score.
One obtains other scoring methods by using a different sequence of non-decreasing scores. These methods
are also called positional voting methods.
The modern axiomatic approach permits the understanding of the respective features of the two
voting rules advocated by these two eighteenth century scientists. Moulin (1988) gives an account of the
respective strengths and weaknesses of the two kinds of rules. Using an innovative geometric approach,
Saari (1995) also puts into perspective the radically different properties of the two methods.
In two fundamental papers, Young (1974, 1988) proves that the scoring voting rules are the only
social choice functions that satisfy an axiom called reinforcement and some extra mild axioms.
Reinforcement requires that, if two different electorates select the same alternative, then the union of the
two should also selects this alternative. This result provides an important argument in defense of the Borda
rule.
3On the other hand, it is well known that the scoring rules behave badly with respect to
modifications in the choice set. This makes them prone to manipulation by large coalitions. They can also
give rise to all kind of paradoxes. However Saari (1989) shows that, of all the scoring methods, the Borda
rule or an extension of the latter is the one least susceptible to these paradoxes. Saari (1990) shows that
it is the least susceptible to manipulation by small coalitions. In the same vein, Gehrlein et al. (1982) show
that, among scoring rules, the Borda one is least likely to change the winner when a non-winner is
removed from the list of alternatives.
Given the respective strengths of the Borda and Condorcet social choice functions, an institution
that would opt for a Condorcet function would be well advised to choose one that is as close as possible
to the Borda rule. In this paper, we propose a simple measure of the difference between the Borda rule
and any given social choice function. This measure is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved
by the social choice function under scrutiny over the Borda score of a Borda winner. More precisely, we
take the minimum of this ratio over all possible profiles of preferences.
This "Borda measure" of a given social choice function is in the spirit of the Copeland measure
of Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton (1994). It is a measure that focuses on the worst profiles under which
the alternate social choice function could operate when compared to the Borda rule. It gives a first
indication as to how far from the Borda rule the alternate social choice function can be.
Instead, one could have opted for some average ratio, given some probability measure on the set
of profiles. Such an approach would have been in the spirit of Condorcet’s work. But it would have posed
the problem of selecting the probability measure on the set of profiles and it would have required more
complex computations, because of the combinatorial nature of the problem. This is why we opt for the
simpler measure proposed here.
We also compute this "Borda measure" or at least bounds for this measure for well known
Condorcet social choice functions. Most of them are reviewed by Levin and Nalebuff (1995). The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The main definitions are given in section 2. In section 3,
4we compute the "Borda measure" of the Condorcet rule by obviously considering only profiles for which
a Condorcet winner exists. In section 4, we consider a familiar social choice function named after Kemeny
(1959). We provide a close interval for the "Borda measure" of this rule. It turns out that the Kemeny rule
almost achieves the "Borda measure" of the Condorcet rule. Young (1995) promotes the Kemeny rule
because it is a natural extension of the maximum likelihood approach developed by Condorcet. Our result
confirms this fact.
In sections 5 and 6, we focus on quite different social choice functions proposed by Copeland
(1951), and Simpson (1969). We provide upper bounds for the "Borda measure" of these rules. They
indicate that these rules do not do as well as the Kemeny rule. Saari and Merlin (1996) show that a Borda
winner and a Copeland winner can be as far apart as one can imagine in terms of their relative rankings.
Our results supplement theirs in showing how far from the Borda winner a Copeland winner can be in
terms of the Borda scores.
In Sections 7 and 8, we study the top cycle introduced by Good (1971) and the uncovered set
proposed by Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1980). The top cycle does as well as the Condorcet rule. We
conjecture that this is also the case for the uncovered set. Section 9 concludes with a more detailed
comparison of these functions in terms of their Borda measures.
2. Notation and preliminary results
Throughout this paper, N is the set of individuals or voters and X the set of alternatives. Their
cardinality is respectively N = n ³ 3 and X = m ³ 3. Each individual i Î N is assumed to have a
transitive strict preference, i.e. a linear order Pi on X. Let L represent the set of linear orders on X.
A profile is a P =( P1, ..., Pn) Î L
n.
Given a profile P Î L
n and a pair (x, y) Î X, let nxy(P)= { i Î N : xPiy} . By convention,
nxx(P)=0 ," x Î X. The following lemma follows from transitivity of the preferences. It is stated without
proof.
5Lemma 1: For any profile P and any x, y, z Î X, nxy(P) ³ nxz(P)+nzy(P)−n.
For a given profile P, a binary relation M(P)o nX is defined by xM(P)y if and only if
nxy(P)>nyx(P). A profile P Î L
n induces a tournament on X whenever M(P) is complete. Obviously,
when n is odd, any P induces a tournament on X.




X represents the family of all subsets of X. G(P) is the set of alternatives selected
by the SCF.
An alternative x Î X is a Condorcet winner for a given profile P if nxy(P)>nyx(P) " y ¹ x.
A SCF G is a Condorcet type function if G(P)={ x} whenever x is the Condorcet winner. If the majority
relation M yields an order over all alternatives, then this order is the Condorcet order.
Given an x Î X and a profile P Î L
n, let R(x, Pi)= { y Î X : xPiy} . The Borda score of x is
defined as: B(x, P)=å
n
i=1R(x, Pi). Let B
*(P) = max x Î XB(x, P). Any x Î argmax x Î XB(x, P)i saBorda
winner. Bor(P) is the set of Borda winners for profile P. The following useful lemma is well known and
will not be proven.
Lemma 2: B(x, P)=å y Î Xnxy(P).
Given a SCF G, we propose the following measure for the discrepancy between G and the Borda







In plain words, this measure is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved by an
alternative chosen by G over the Borda score of a Borda winner. More precisely, we take the minimum
of this ratio over all possible profiles of preferences. This measure is invariant with respect to a linear
transformation of the function R( , ). However, it is not invariant with respect to affine transformations.
6Adding any positive constant to the R(x, Pi), x Î X, would increase the value of our measure toward 1.
Yet, there is much to be said in favour of the scores originally proposed by Borda as we did. Indeed,
according to Lemma 2, the Borda score of alternative x is the total number of other alternatives defeated
by x in all pairwise comparisons. Our measure is a ratio of such totals numbers, which have a natural
interpretation.
The precise value of this measure or the bounds for this value that will be obtained for different
SCFs will often depend on whether n or m is odd or even. Thus they will often involve the function





1i f n is odd
2i f n is even
3. Condorcet
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the subset of profiles for which there exists a Condorcet
winner and we find the Borda measure BCon of the SCFs selecting this winner.
Lemma 3: If n £ mn(n)/(m − 2), i.e. for (n, m) = (3, 3), (4, 3), (4, 4), and (6, 3), the Condorcet winner
is a Borda winner.
Proof. Without any loss of generality, let us concentrate on the profiles such that 1 is the Condorcet
winner. The latter requires profiles such that n1j(P) ³ (n + n(n))/2, j = 2, ..., m, which implies
nj1(P) £ (n − n(n))/2, j = 2, ..., m. For any P such that 1 is the Condorcet winner, we thus have
B(1, P) ³ (m − 1)(n + n(n))/2 and B(j, P) £ (m −2 ) n +( n − n(n))/2 = ((2m −3 ) n − n(n))/2,
j = 2, ..., m.I fn £ mn(n)/(m − 2), we have B(j, P) £ ((2m −3 ) n − n(n))/2 £














if n > mn(n)
m 2






subject to alternative 1 being the Condorcet winner and 2 a Borda winner. From the proof of Lemma 3,
for 1 to be the Condorcet winner, we need B(1, P) ³ (m − 1)(n + n(n))/2 and
B(2, P) £ ((2m −3 ) n − n(n))/2. These bounds are reached for profile P
1 defined by:
(1, 2, ..., m) for (n + n(n))/2 individuals,
(2, 3, ..., m, 1) for the remaining (n − n(n))/2 individuals.























BCon(n, m) is compiled in Table 1 for m £ 15 and n £ 40. The limits of BCon with respect to n and
m appear respectively in the bottom row and the last column.
From now on, we shall allow for all profiles of preferences. Hence the existence of a Condorcet
winner will not be guaranteed. The SCFs that we shall examine all pick the Condorcet winner when it
exists but differ in their choice of a set of alternatives when there is no Condorcet winner.
84. Kemeny
Kemeny (1959) proposes a principle to order all alternatives, which works for any profile. This
order agrees with the Condorcet order when the latter exists. A Kemeny order is closest to the given






1i f xP1y and yP2x
0 otherwise
and D(P1, P2)=åx Î Xåy Î Xdxy(P1, P2).





A Kemeny order for a profile P is an order belonging to argmin O Î Ld(O, P). A Kemeny winner
is a top element of a Kemeny order. The Kemeny SCF, Ke, selects the Kemeny winners.
Young (1988) shows that the principle advocated by Kemeny is very much in the spirit of
Condorcet’s endeavour. Take a situation where there is some sense in saying that an alternative is
objectively better than another one. Suppose that the ranking of these two alternatives by each voter is his
or her evaluation of the true ranking and that the probability that each voter be right is greater than 1/2.
Then the Kemeny order is the one that has the maximum likelihood of being the true ranking over all
alternatives. This is precisely what Condorcet was after. The following lemmas and corollaries list some
of the properties of a Kemeny order.



















Lemma 7: Suppose O = (1, 2, ..., m) is a Kemeny order for a given profile P. Then nj, j+1(P) ³ nj+1, j(P),
j = 1, ..., m −1 .
Proof.Foranyj = 1, ..., m − 1,considertheorderO
* = (1, 2, ..., j −1 ,j +1 ,j, j + 2, ..., m).Bytheproof
of Lemma 6, d(O
*,P )−d(O, P)=nj, j+1 − nj+1, j, which cannot be negative if O is a Kemeny order.
Corollary 8: Suppose O = (1, 2, ..., m) is a Kemeny order for a given profile P. Then, if there exists a
Condorcet winner under this profile, this winner must be alternative 1.
Proof. From Lemma 7, nj, j−1(P) £ n/2, j = 2, ..., m. Thus none of the alternatives j = 2, ..., m may be a
Condorcet winner.
Lemma 9: If x is a (unique) Kemeny winner for a profile P, then å y Î X nxy(P) ³ (m −1 ) n/ 2 (>) .
Proof. Without any loss of generality, suppose O = (1, 2, ..., m) is a (unique) Kemeny order and consider
the order O










j =2n1j(P)−( m −1 ) n ³ 0 (>) .
Lemma 10: (m −1 ) n/((2m −3 ) n − n(n)) £ BKe(n, m) £ BCon(n, m).
Proof. From Corollary 8, the Kemeny SCF always selects the Condorcet winner when it exists. Hence
BKe(n, m) is bounded above by BCon(n, m). Turning to the lower bound, let us restrict ourselves, without
any loss of generality, to profiles that yield alternative 1 as a Kemeny winner and 2 as a Borda winner.
According to Lemma 9, for alternative 1 to be a Kemeny winner, we must have B(1, P) º
å
m
j =2n1j(P) ³ (m −1 ) n/2. We must also have n2j(P) £ (n − n(n))/2 for at least one j ¹ 2. Otherwise 2 would
be a Condorcet and a Kemeny winner. Thus, we must have B(2, P) £ (m −2 ) n +( n − n(n))/2 =
10((2m −3 ) n − n(n))/2. Hence any profile P under which 1 is a Kemeny winner and 2 a Borda winner





The right-hand side of the latter inequality is also a lower bound for BKe(n, m).
Corollary 11: limn ®¥BKe(n, m)=( m − 1)/(2m − 3).
Proof. The limits of the left-hand and right-hand sides of the inequalities in Lemma 10 are both
(m − 1)/(2m − 3).
According to the last corollary, the possible discrepancy between the Condorcet and the Kemeny
SCFs vanishes as the number of voters increases. The next theorem shows that, for finite values of (n, m),
BKe is actually lower than BCon, except when (n, m) = (3, 3), (4, 3), (4, 4), and (6, 3). The discrepancy is
highest when there are few voters. The exception obtains because the best profiles that we are able to find
in the next theorem toward achieving the Borda measure of the Kemeny rule yield a Kemeny winner that
is also a Borda winner. Recall that BCon(n, m) = 1 for these pairs of (n, m). We are quite confident that
the upper bounds given in this theorem cannot be improved.
Theorem 12: Let
F11(n, m) (m 1)n n(m) 3
(2m 3)n (m 3) n(m)
, F12(n, m) (m 1)n n(m) 3
2(m 2)n 2
,
F21(n, m) (m 1)n 2
2m(n 1) 3n 2
, F22(n, m) (m 1)n 2
2(m 2)n 2
.
Then, BKe(n, m) £ F11(n, m), for n = 3 and 5. For n ³ 7 and odd, BKe(n, m) £ min(F11(n, m), F12(n, m)).
For (n, m) ¹ (4, 3) and n even, BKe(n, m) £ min(F21(n, m), F22(n, m)).
Proof. For n odd, consider profile P
11 defined by:
(1, 2, ..., m) for (n − 1)/2 voters,
(2, 3, ..., m, 1) for (n − 1)/2 voters,
11(m −2+n(m), ..., 6, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5, ..., m +1−n(m)) for the remaining voter.
Under this profile, (1, 2, 3, ..., m) is the unique Kemeny order, alternative 2 a Borda winner (ex-aequo
with 1 for m=n= 3, unique otherwise) and B(1, P
11)/B(2, P
11)=F11(n, m). Thus F11(n, m) is an upper
bound for BKe(n, m) when n is odd, the best that we could find for n = 3 and 5.
For n ³ 7 and odd, consider profile P
12 defined by:
(1, 2, 3, ..., m) for (n − 7)/2 voters,
(1, 3, 2, 4, ..., m) for 3 voters,
(3, 2, 4, 5, ..., m, 1) for (n − 3)/2 voters,
(2, 4, 5, ..., m, 1, 3) for 1 voter,
(2, 4, 6, ..., m −2+n(m), 1, 3, 5, 7, ..., m +1−n(m)) for the remaining voter.
Under this profile, (1, 3, 2, 4, ..., m) is now the unique Kemeny order, alternative 2 remains the unique
Borda winner if m > 3, and B(1, P
12)/B(2, P
12)=F12(n, m). Thus F12(n, m) is another upper bound for
BKe(n, m) when n is odd and m > 3. It is smaller than F11(n, m) if and only if n<m−5+n(m). Since
one must have n ³ 7 for P
12 to be defined, this last condition implies m > 12.
For n even, consider profile P
21 defined by:
(1, 2, ..., m) for n/2 voters,
(2, m, ..., 5, 4, 3, 1) for (n − 2)/2 voters,
(3, 4, 5, ..., m, 1, 2) for the remaining voter.
and profile P
22 defined by:
(1, 2, 3, ..., m) for (n − 4)/2 voters,
(1, 3, 2, ..., m) for 2 voters,
(3, 2, 4, 5, ..., m, 1) for (n − 2)/2 voters,
(2, 4, 5, ..., m, 1, 3) for the remaining voter.
Note that B(1, P
21)/B(2, P
21)=F21(n, m) and B(1, P
22)/B(2, P
22)=F22(n, m). The unique Kemeny order
is (1, 2, 3, ..., m) under P
21 and (1, 3, 2, 4, ..., m) under P
22. For (n, m) = (4, 3), both profiles P
21 and P
22
yield alternative 1 as the unique Borda winner as well as the Kemeny winner. Thus the bound given
12BCon(4, 3) = 1 cannot be improved with any of these two profiles. For m = 3, and any even n, alternative
1 is the unique Borda winner under P
22 but, for n ¹ 4, alternative 2 is a Borda winner under P
21 (ex-aequo
with 1 for n = 6, unique otherwise). Thus, for m = 3 and n ¹ 4, F21(n, m) is an upper bound for BKe(n, m).
For m > 3, both P
21 and P
22 make alternative 2 a Borda winner (ex-aequo with 1 for m=n= 4, unique
otherwise). Thus, for n even and (n, m) ¹ (4, 3), F21(n, m) and F22(n, m) are two upper bounds for
BKe(n, m). We have F21(n, m)>F22(n, m) Û m >( n + 4)/2.
Remark 13: From the proof of the last theorem, F11(n, m)>F12(n, m) and F21(n, m)>F22(n, m) when m
is sufficiently large with respect to n. Thus, when m becomes large and n takes fixed values other than
3 and 5, the best upper bound for BKe is given by F12 or F22. Since limm ®¥F12(n, m) = limm ®¥F22(n, m)=
1/2, BKe is bounded above by 1/2 when m increases. Also note that limm ®¥F11(n, m) = limm ®¥F21(n, m)=
n/(2n − 1). In particular, limm ®¥F11(3, m) = 3/5 and limm ®¥F11(5, m) = 5/9. The limit with respect to n
for BKe has been established in Corollary 11. It is an exact value.
The best upper bounds for BKe(n, m) are compiled in Table 2 for m £ 15 and n £ 40. The limits
of BKe with respect to n and m appear respectively in the bottom row and the last column. Bold numbers
are given by F12 or F22. All others by F11 or F21.
We are quite confident that the upper bounds given in Theorem 12 cannot be improved. Actually,
we can be more affirmative in the case m =3 .F o rn odd, profile P
11 reduces to:
(1, 2, 3) for (n + 1)/2 voters,
(2, 3, 1) for (n − 1)/2 voters.
This is clearly the best that can be done in order to give alternatives 1 and 2 respectively the lowest and
highest possible Borda scores under the constraint that alternative 1 is a unique Kemeny winner.
For n even, profile P
21 reduces to:
(1, 2, 3) for n/2 voters,
(2, 3, 1) for (n − 2)/2 voters,
13(3, 1, 2) for the remaining voter.
By having one voter of type (3, 1, 2) instead of one more of type (1, 2, 3), one obtains a lower value for
the B(1, P)/B(2, P) ratio. But one cannot have more voters of the last type without making alternative 3
a Condorcet winner. This is again the best that can be done.
5. Copeland
Copeland (1951) proposes a different and simple way of selecting winning alternatives.
The Copeland SCF is the function Cop that selects the alternatives that defeat a maximum number of
other alternatives. Let s(x, P)= { y Î X : nxy(P)>nyx(P)} . This is the Copeland score of x. Cop is
defined by: Cop(P) = argmax x Î X s(x, P).
For any tournament, the following holds:
yÎX
y¹x
s(y, P) m(m 1)
2
.
Thus, if an alternative x is a Copeland winner under a profile P that induces a tournament, we must have
s(x, P) ³ (m − 1)/2. However, if this condition is satisfied with equality, then all other alternatives are also
Copeland winners. The next lemma gives a necessary condition for an alternative to be a unique Copeland
winner.
Lemma 15: Given a profile P that induces a tournament on X, if an alternative x is a unique Copeland
winner, then s(x, P)>m/2, i.e. s(x, P) ³ (m + n(m))/2.
Proof. Suppose s(x, P) £ m/2, i.e. s(x, P) £ (m + n(m) − 2)/2. Then
yÎX
y¹x
s(y, P) m(m 1)
2








s(y, P) ³ m 1
2
.
This in turn implies s(y, P) ³ m n(m) 2
2
³ s(x, P).
14Corollary 16: For m = 3 or 4, a unique Copeland winner under a profile that induces a tournament is a
Condorcet winner.
Using Lemma 15, it is easy to establish a lower bound for BCop(n, m). This is the object of the next
theorem.
Theorem 17: Let G(n, m) (m n(m))(n n(n))
m(3n n(n)) n(n(m) 4) n(m)n(n)
.
For any profile P that induces a tournament, G(n, m) £ BCop(n, m).
Proof. Without any loss of generality, consider a profile P such that alternative 1 is a unique Copeland
winner while 2 is a Borda winner. From Lemma 15,












Combining these two inequalities yields the result.
From Corollary 16, we know that BCop(n, m)=BCon(n, m) for m = 3 or 4. The value of BCon(n, m)
has been established exactly in Theorem 4. We thus have an exact value of BCop(n, m) for m = 3 or 4. In
the next theorem, we establish upper bounds for BCop(n, m) that will be lower than BCon(n, m) for larger
values of m and large enough values of n. We are again confident that it is not possible to lower the value
of the lowest of these bounds when it is already smaller than BCon(n, m). We actually show that the upper
bound that is given for the subset of profiles that induce a tournament on X, and in particular for n odd,
becomes exact when we take the limit with respect to m or n.
Theorem 18: Let E(n, m)=2 ( m+n− 1)/(mn −2 )a n d
where D(n, m) m(n 3n(n)) nn(m) n(n)(n(m) 4)





0i f m <8
1i f m ³ 8.
Then BCop(n, m) £ D(n, m). Moreover, for n even, BCop(n, m) £ E(n, m)<D(n, m).
15Proof. Consider the following profile over 15 alternatives:
(5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 6, 10, 12, 14) for (n −3 n(n))/2 voters,
(7, 5, 11, 9, 15, 13, 1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 14, 6, 3, 4) for n(n) voters,
(2, 14, 12, 10, 6, 8, 4, 3, 15, 13, 11, 9, 7, 5, 1) for (n −3 n(n))/2 voters,
(2, 8, 10, 12, 14, 4, 6, 3, 5, 9, 7, 13, 11, 15, 1) for n(n) voters,
(1, 3, 4, 6, 15, 13, 14, 11, 12, 9, 10, 7, 5, 2, 8) for the remaining n(n) voters.
For n = 9, it yields the majority matrix of Table 5. To get the general matrix, replace 4 by (n − n(n))/2,
5b y( n + n(n))/2, 8 by n − n(n)a n d9b yn. This profile can be extended or reduced in an obvious way
to any number of alternatives. Call the general profile P
31. For any m and for n odd, it yields a tournament
in which 1 is the unique Copeland winner and 2 the unique Borda winner. Moreover B(1, P
31)/B(2, P
31)=
D(n, m), hence the first statement of the theorem.
For n even, consider profile P
32 defined by:
(1, 2, ..., m) for one voter,
(2, 3, ..., m, 1) for (n − 2)/2 voters,
(4, ..., m, 1, 2, 3) for one voter,
(m, ..., 4, 1, 2, 3) for the remaining (n − 2)/2 voters.
It gives n12 = n13 =( n + 2)/2, n23 = n, n1j = 1, and n2j = n/2, j = 4, ..., m, and nij =n /2, j>i ,i= 3, ..., m.
Thus 1 is a unique Copeland winner and 2 a Borda winner. For m = 3, alternative 1 is also a Condorcet
winner. Moreover B(1, P
32)/B(2, P
32)=E(n, m), hence the second statement of the theorem.
Corollary 19: For n even, lim
n®¥











Within the subset of profiles that induce a tournament on X, and in particular for n odd,
lim
n®¥












Proof. The first assertion follows from Theorem 18, the second from the combination of Theorems 17 and
























Remark 20: For some small values of m and n, profile P
1, which makes 1 a Condorcet hence a Copeland
winner, gives a ratio B(1, P
1)/B(2, P
1) that is smaller than both D(n, m) and E(n, m). Thus a least upper
bound for BCop(n, m) is either BCon(n, m)o rD(n, m) for n odd and E(n, m) for n even. These bound appear
in Table 3. Bold numbers are the same as for the Condorcet rule. For n even profile P
32, for which E(n, m)
is attained, does not yield a tournament. If we were to restrict ourselves to profiles that induce a
tournament on X, as with P
31, then D(n, m) would be the bound to use instead of E(n, m). The resulting
numbers would be slightly higher than the ones that can be infered by interpolating from those of Table 3
for n odd. The reason is that the 1 and n − 1 in the majority matrix would become 2 and n − 2 respec-
tively. Two limits with respect to n are given. The first row gives the limit of D(n, m), which is valid if
we restrict ourselves to tournaments. The second row gives the limit of E(n, m), which is valid if we
restrict ourselves to even n and allow for profile P
32 that does not induce a tournament.
In a recent paper, Saari and Merlin (1996) show that, for m ³ 5 and any two rankings of the
candidates, there exist profiles where these rankings are, respectively, the Copeland and the Borda
rankings. In particular, for any alternative, there exist profiles such that this candidate is the Copeland
winner but occupies the last position in the Borda ranking. Profile P
32 used in the proof of Theorem 18
is an illustration of this result. Indeed, one can check that B(1, P
32)=m+n− 1 while
B(3, P
32)=( n(m − 2) − 2)/2. Thus 2B(3, P
32)−2 B(1, P
32)=n(m −4 )−2 m > 0 if and only if m ³ 5 and
n >2 m/(m − 4). Alternative 3 being the more serious other contender for the last place in the Borda
ranking, this shows that alternative 1 is the Borda looser for values of m and n satisfying the above ine-
qualities.
17Moreover our results supplement the ordinal finding of Saari and Merlin by showing how far from
the Borda winner a Copeland winner can be in terms of the Borda scores. Given the intrinsic interest in
the Borda scores, this is useful information. Our results show that the Copeland winner can do pretty bad
when n is even and when n and m become large, the limit being 0. The problem is less dramatic when
n is odd. For small values of n and m, the Copeland rule does as most as well as the Condorcet rule when
it does not perform exactly as the latter.
6. Kramer-Simpson
Simpson (1969) proposes a quite different method of avoiding the Condorcet paradox in Euclidean
spaces. Adapting his principle to our finite context gives: The alternative s of voter maximum agreement
should be one where the maximum number of voters wishing to move to any other alternative is as small
as possible over the range of alternatives. It is the democratic hope so to speak, that the number wishing
an alternative other than s is small. If it less than half the voters, democracy is in good luck and s tops
all other alternatives. To be more precise, s should belong to argminx Î Xmaxy Î Xnyx(P). Kramer (1977)
justifies this principle by showing that the minmax set is the equilibrium of sequential electoral
competition between two parties whose platforms belong to an Euclidean space.
We call this function the Kramer-Simpson SCF and we define it equivalently by
KS(P) = argmaxx Î Xminy Î X\xnxy(P). An element of KS(P) is a Kramer-Simpson winner.
Lemma 23: BKS(n, m) £ BCon(n, m), " n, m ³ 3.
Proof. Suppose x Î X is a Condorcet winner. Then nxy( P )>n yx(P) " y Î X\{x}. Thus clearly x is a
Kramer-Simpson winner, giving the upper bound for BKS.
The next three theorems establish smaller upper bounds for large enough values of m or n.
Theorem 24: BKS(n, m) £ 4(m − 1)/(m
2 − m − 4), " m ³ 6, " n ³ 2(m −1 )o rn=m−1 .
18Proof. Consider the m − 1 following orders:
O
2 = (2, 3, ..., m −2 ,1 ,m −1 ,m)
O




m =( m, 2, ..., m −3 ,1 ,m −2 ,m − 1).
Then let p = n/(m − 1) where a represents the largest integer smaller or equal to a,
k=n−p (m − 1), nj =p ,j= 2, ..., m−k , and nj =p+1 ,j=m−k+ 1, ..., m. Since å
m
j =2nj =n , one
can partition the set of voters into m − 1 subsets containing nj individuals, for j = 2, ..., m. Next, consider
the profile P
2 defined by giving preference O
j to the nj individuals of subset j, for j = 2, ..., m. In plain
words, each order O
j is shared by p different individuals and the k remaining individuals, if any, are
distributed among the last k orders. A parameter a appears in the remaining of the proof so that the latter
















p if k 0
p 1i f k >0
Since n ³ (4 − a)(m − 1) implies p ³ 4−a and n=m− 1 implies p = 1 and k = 0, alternative 1 turns
out to be the unique Kramer-Simpson winner. Turning to Borda scores, B(1, P
2)=an and B(m, P
2)=
(m −1 ) mp/2 − ap+k m−k (k + 1)/2 − max(0, a + k +1−m). One can check that m is the Borda
winner in the set of alternatives {2, ..., m} (unique if and only if k > 0, i.e. p<n /(m − 1)). In the case
where p=n /(m −1 )a n dk = 0, we have B(m, P



















>0 Û m >1 2a.








19In the more general case, B(m, P
2) ³ nm/2 − a/(m − 1). Since there is no loss of generality in letting 1
be a Kramer-Simpson winner and m a Borda winner, rather than any other pair of alternatives, we have
BKS(n, m) £ 2a(m − 1)/(m
2 − m −2 a), " m ³ 2(a + 1), " n ³ (4 − a)(m −1 )o rn=m−1 .
The next theorem establishes another upper bound on BKS(n, m) for the case m ³ 8 and n ³ m −1 .
Theorem 25: BKS(n, m) £ 6(m − 1)/(m
2 − m − 6), " m ³ 8 and " n ³ m −1 .
Proof. Raise alternative 1 by one position in all orders of profile P
2 and set a = 3 in the proof of
Theorem 23.
The next theorem establishes another upper bound for BKS(n, m), which, although larger than the
ones obtained in the last two theorems, is smaller than BCon for some (n, m) such that m ³ 7 and
n<m−1 .
Theorem 26:BKS(n, m) £ 8/(2m − n −1−2 m a x ( 0 ,n − m + 5)/n),form =7andn =3,m = 8andn £ 5,
or m ³ 9 and n £ m −2 .
Proof. Set a = 4 in the proof of Theorem 23 and raise alternative 1 by two positions in all orders of
profile P
2. We are left with orders O
k, ..., O
m only in this profile, where k=nin this case. Call P
42 the
modified profile. It yields B(m, P
42)=( 2 m − n −1 ) n/2 − max(0, n − m + 5) and one can check that this
score is larger than B(1, P
42) for the values of m and n given in the statement of the theorem and only
for these values. Hence the result.
Remark 27: The proofs of Theorems 24 and 25 give upper bounds on BKS that are smaller than the ones
given in the statement of these theorems. The general formula for these upper bound is:
an/((m −1 ) mp/2 − ap+k m−k (k + 1)/2 − max(0, a + k +1−m)), with a = 2, 3 or 4 according to
whether n ³ 2(m − 1) (or n=m− 1), m −1<n <2 ( m −1 )o rn<m− 1. For a = 2 or 3, the restriction
on m may also vary slightly from the one given in Theorems 24 and 25. Table 4 gives the best of the four
bounds established in Lemma 23 and Theorems 24, 25, and 26.
20Remark 28: From Theorem 26, Since p>n /(m − 1) − 1, the upper bound given lim
m®¥
BKS(n, m) 0.
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7. The Top Cycle
The SCFs examined in the previous sections propose different ways of breaking cycles in M(P).
Instead of breaking these cycles, we might settle for a cruder SCF that leaves us with a set of alternatives
that form a cycle and defeat all other alternatives under the relation M(P). Such a set is called the top
cycle. The name of Schwartz (1972) is often associated with this concept because of the axiomatization
he makes of this rule. However, Good (1971) is probably the first to introduce this concept, which he calls
the Condorcet set, in the literature. Miller (1980) calls it the minimal undominated set.
For a given profile P, let M
*(P) be the transitive closure of M(P), i.e. xM
*(P)y if there exists a
sequence x=x 0, x1, ..., xk =ysuch that xiM
*(P)xi+1, i = 0, ..., k − 1. The top cycle of X with respect to
P is defined by TC(P)={ x Î X : xM
*(P)y, " y Î X\{x}}. It always exists by transitivity of M
*.
Lemma 29: Ke(P) Í TC(P).
Proof. Let x Î Ke(P). From Lemma 6, xM
*(P)y, " y Î X\{x}. Thus x Î TC(P).
21Corollary 30: BKe(n, m) £ BTC(n, m) £ BCon(n, m).
Actually we can do better and show that BTC(n, m)=BCon(n, m). We begin with the following
lemma, the contain of which is well known. See Moulin (1988, Exercise 9.10) or Miller (1980). Parts b
and c give the substence of this concept.
Lemma 31: a) TC(P)={ x} Û x is the Condorcet winner;
b) TC(P) is the smallest subset Y Í X such that y Î Y, x Î X\Y Þ yM(P)x;
c) TC(P) ¹ 2;
d) If TC(P) ³ 3, then one can order TC(P)a s{ x1, ..., xk} such that xiM(P)xi+1, i = 1, ..., k −1 ,
xkM(P)x1 and such that this cycle is of maximal length.
Lemma 32: For m = 3 and 4, the Borda winners belong to the top cycle whenever the latter is not a
singleton.
Proof. Obvious for m = 3 from Lemma 31. For m = 4, let {1, 2, 3} be the top cycle with 1M2, 2M3, and
3M1. In order that the Borda score of all members of the top cycle be as small as possible, suppose n12 =
n23 = n31 > n/2. This implies n21 = n32 = n13, n12 + n13 = n21 + n23 = n31 + n32 =n ,n14 = n24 = n34 > n/2, and
n41 = n42 = n43 < n/2. Thus {1, 2, 3} is the set of the Borda winners.
Theorem 33: BTC(n, m)=BCon(n, m).
Proof. For m = 3 and 4, the result follows from Lemma 32. For m ³ 5, consider a profile P such that
TC(P) = {1, ..., k} with k ³ 3. By Lemma 31, nij(P) ³ (n + n(n))/2 for i £ k<j , which implies




j=1nij(P)= ( k(k −1 ) n)/2, we have
maxi Î TC(P)å
k
j=1nij(P) ³ (k −1 ) n/2. LetB1(P)=m a x x Î TC(P)B(x, P) and B2(P)=m a x x Ï TC(P)B(x, P). From what
precedes, B1(P) ³ (k −1 ) n/ 2+( m−k )(n + n(n))/2 and B2(P) £ k(n − n(n))/2 + (m−k−1 ) n.
If B1(P) ³ B2(P), then B
*(P)=B1(P) and B1(P)/B
*(P)=1³ BCon(n, m). Otherwise let
A (k 1)n (m k)(n n(n))
k(n n(n)) 2(m k 1)n
22C (k 1)n(n) (k 1)n (m k)(n n(n))
n n(n) (k 1)(n n(n)) (k 1)(n n(n)) 2(m k 1)n
D (k 1)(n n(n)) (m k)(n n(n))
n n(n) 2(k 1)n 2(m k 1)n
E (m 1)(n n(n))
n n(n) 2(m 2)n
and recall that BCon is attained for profile P
1 and that n1j(P
1)=( n + n(n))/2, j = 2, ..., m, n21(P
1)=
(n − n(n))/2, and n2j(P




1)=BCon(n, m). The first inequality follows from the definition of B1(P) and B2(P). As for
A>C , let a be the numerator of C, b its denominator, a =( k −1 ) n(n) and b =( k − 1)(n + n(n)). Then
A =( a − a)/(b − b) and A>Cfollows from the fact that a/b < 1/2 < a/b.
8. The Uncovered Set
Unfortunately, the top cycle is in general very large and may contain Pareto-inefficient alternatives.
It is not difficult to find example where it is the whole set X. For these reasons, Fishburn (1977) and
Miller (1980) have independently come up with a more decisive SCF called the uncovered set.
For a given profile P, let us consider the binary relation defined on X by xC(P)y if xM(P)y and
if yM(P)z implies xM(P)z, " z Î X. It is called the covering relation of X with respect to P. The un-
covered set UC(P)o fX with respect to P is the set of maximal elements of the covering relation, i.e.
UC(P)={ x Î X : y Î X : yC(P)x}. This set always exits since the covering relation is transitive.
Throughout this section we shall confine ourselves to profiles that induce tournaments on X. We have the
following lemma the content of which can also be found in Moulin (1988, Exercise 9.11) or Miller (1980).
Lemma 34: a) x Î UC(P) Û" y Î X, xMy or $ z Î X : xMzand zMy.
b) UC(P)={ x} Û x is the Condorcet winner.
c) UC(P) ¹ 2.
23d) Cop(P) Í UC(P) Í TC(P).
Corollary 35: For m = 3, the Borda winners belong to UC(P) whenever the latter is not a singleton.
Lemma 36: For n =4 ,UC(P) is a singleton for any profile P that induces a tournament on X.
Proof. Consider any x Î UC(P). If UC(P) is not a singleton, then, by Lemma 34 b), there must exist a
y Î X such that notxMy, i.e. nxy £ 1. Then, by Lemma 34 a), there must exist a z Î X such that xMz and
zMy, i.e. nxz ³ 3 and nzy ³ 3. By Lemma 1, this implies nxy ³ 2, a contradiction.
Corollary 37: BUC(4, m)=BCon(4, m).
Conjecture 38: BUC(n, m)=BCon(n, m).
For m =3o rn = 4, there is nothing to prove. For n ¹ 4 and m ³ 4, let
H(n, m) (m 3)(n n(n)) 2n
(2m 8)n 4(n n(n))
and consider profile P
51 defined by:
(4, 5, ..., m,3 ,2 ,1 )f o r( n −3 n(n))/2 voters,
(2, 4, 5, ..., m,3 ,1 )f o rn(n) voters,
(3, 1, 4, 5, ..., m,2 )f o rn(n) voters,
(1, 2, 4, 5, ..., m, 3) for (n − n(n))/2 voters.
Under this profile, {1, 2, 3} is the uncovered set, alternative 4 is the unique Borda winner when
(m −3 ) n >( m −1 ) n(n)), and B(x, P
51)/B(4, P
51)= H(n, m), for x = 1, 2. However, one can write
H(n, m)=( a − a)/(b − b) where a is the numerator of C in the previous section, b its denominator,
a =2 n(n) and b = n +3 n(n). Since a/b < 1/2 < a/b, it follows that a/b < H(n, m). Note that a/b =
BCon(n, m) when (m −3 ) n >( m −1 ) n(n). When this condition is not satisfied, alternatives 1 and 2 are the
Borda winners giving us a potential value of 1 for BUC(n, m), which again is as least as large as BCon(n, m).
Hence, profile P
51 gives us an upper bound for BUC that is as least as large as BCon(n, m).
24We conjecture that it is not possible to improve upon profile P
51 if the uncovered set must not be a
singleton. First of all notice that, under P
51, the Copeland score of alternative 4 is just one below the one
of alternatives 1 and 2. This gap must be maintained for alternative 4 to remain outside of the uncovered
set. The numbers of votes for alternatives 1 and 2 are as small as possible given the constraint that must
be maintained on the Copeland scores. The numbers of votes for alternative 4 are also as large as possible
in view of the same constraint and Lemma 1.
One will note that n1j = n2j =( n + n(n))/2 and n3j = n(n), j ³ 4. One might think that interchanging some
of these values could reduce the numerator in H(n, m). Again this is not possible because of the same
constraint or Lemma 1.
A profile yielding an uncovered set larger than 3 would not do any good either. It would reduce the Borda
score of the Borda winner while keeping the largest Borda score in the uncovered set almost unchanged.
Remark 39: From Lemma 34 d), BCop(n, m) constitutes a lower bound for BUC(n, m). A better bound
could be obtained if we had Ke(P) Ì UC(P), as with the Top cycle, and this would reinforce the preceding
conjecture and make it easier to prove it. Unfortunately, the following example shows that one may have
Ke(P) Ç UC(P)=Æ and Ke(P) Ç Cop(P)=Æ. Let m =4 ,n = 9 and consider the profile defined by:
(1, 2, 3, 4) for 4 voters,
(4, 2, 3, 1) for 3 voter,
(3, 4, 1, 2) for 2 voters.
It can be checked that (1, 2, 3, 4) is the unique Kemeny order so that Ke(P) = {1}, that UC(P)=
{2, 3, 4}, and that Cop(P) = {3, 4}.
For the reason explained in the preceding remark, it would be interesting to have a stronger
covering relation C
* leading to an uncovered set that would satisfy Ke(P) Í UC
*(P). Since the Kemeny
and the Condorcet rules are close in terms of our measure, the chance that BUC*(n, m)=BCon(n, m) should
be better than in the case of UC or, at least, it should be easier to prove it. Such a relation is introduced
and analyzed in De Donder, Le Breton and Truchon (1996). Actually this relation is so strong that we
have Bor(P) Í UC
*(P), " P, and, as a corollary, BUC*(n, m) = 1. This means that UC
* is not a Condorcet
25type function. UC
*(P) contains the Condorcet winner when it exists but it may contain other alternatives
as well, namely the Borda winners, any of which need not be the Condorcet winner.
The relation C
* is defined by xC
*(P) y if and only if xM(P)y and nxz(P) ³ nyz(P) " z Î X\{x, y}.
Let UC
*(P) be the set of maximal elements of the covering relation C
*. It always exists since C
* is
transitive. Let Par(P) be the set of Pareto efficient alternatives. The following lemma is proven in De
Donder et al. (1996).
Lemma 40: a) UC(P) Í UC
*(P) Í Par(P);
b) Supose x is the Condorcet winner. Then x Î UC
*(P);
c) Ke(P) Í UC
*(P);
d) Bor(P) Í UC
*(P).
Corollary 41: BUC*(n, m)=1 .
9. Conclusion
The uncovered set UC
* analyzed at the end of the last section has a perfect Borda score of 1. This
is because the Borda winners always belong to this set. Unfortunately, this set, which is very interesting
in other respects, may contain alternatives other than the Condorcet winner when the latter exists.
For all other SCFs analyzed in this paper, the Borda measure decreases monotonically with respect
to the number m of alternatives and the number n of voters when this last number is odd or even.
However, monotonicity does not hold on the entire set of integers. Thus all rules do best for m and n
small, even achieving the maximum value of 1 for very small numbers of alternatives and voters. This
is because there is a Borda winner among the alternatives that win according to the rule under scrutiny.
The rules that fare better are the Condorcet SCF, the top cycle, and possibly the uncovered set.
They all have the same Borda measures. In the case of the uncovered set, this remains a conjecture. The
Borda measure of these rules is 0.5 in the limit with respect to both m and n. The Kemeny SCF fares
26almost as well as the Condorcet SCF and the top cycle. This is not surprising since the Kemeny rule is
much in the spirit of the Condorcet one. What is more surprising is the fact that the top cycle has the same
measure as the Condorcet one instead of the Kemeny one. Allowing for profiles that yield cycles does not
worsen the Borda measure. One may see the explanation in the fact that the top cycle contains not only
the Kemeny winners but possibly many other alternatives. While Kemeny seeks to break the cycles that
may obtain under the majority relation by picking an order over all alternatives, with the top cycle, one
is left with the largest set of alternatives that defeat all other alternatives without being defeated by the
latter. This is not a very decisive rule. Actually, the top cycle may leave us with the whole set of
alternatives to choose from. The same remarks apply to the uncovered set.
The Copeland and the Kramer-Simpson SCF are two different ways of resolving the presence of
cycles in the majority relation. For small values of m and n, for example for m=n= 5, they seem to do
better than the Kemeny SCF and almost as well as the Condorcet SCF but recall that, except in the limit,
we have only been able to show that the numbers given for these two SCFs are upper bound for their
Borda measure. The performance of these two SCFs deteriorates rapidly as the values of these parameters
increase. The Borda measure of the Kramer SCF goes to 0 as m tends to infinity, whatever the value of
n. The limit of the Borda measure with respect to both m and n is 1/3 for the Copeland SCF if we restrict
ourselves to profiles that yield a tournament and 0 otherwise. It would thus appear that the Kemeny SCF
is the one that does the best in terms of resolving the presence of cycles in the majority relation and in
terms of the Borda measure that we propose in this paper.
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28Table 1: Condorcet
n\m 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ¥
3 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.67
4 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.75
5 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.60
6 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.67
7 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.57
8 0.91 0.79 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.63
9 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.56
10 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.60
11 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.55
12 0.82 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.58
13 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.54
14 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.57
15 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.53
16 0.78 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.56
17 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
18 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.56
19 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
20 0.76 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.55
21 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.52
22 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.55
23 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.52
24 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.54
25 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.52
26 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.54
27 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.52
28 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.54
29 0.70 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.52
30 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.53
31 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.52
32 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.53
33 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52
34 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
35 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.51
36 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
37 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.51
38 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
39 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.51
40 0.71 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
¥ 0.67 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.50Table 2: Kemeny
n\m 3456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 ¥
3 1.00 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.60
4 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.50
5 0.86 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.56
6 1.00 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.50
7 0.80 0.69 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.50
8 0.90 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.50
9 0.77 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.50
10 0.85 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.50
11 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.50
12 0.81 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.50
13 0.74 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.50
14 0.79 0.69 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.50
15 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
16 0.77 0.68 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.50
17 0.72 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
18 0.76 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.50
19 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
20 0.75 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.50
21 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.50
22 0.74 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.50
23 0.71 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.50
24 0.74 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.50
25 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.50
26 0.73 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.50
27 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
28 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.50
29 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
30 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
31 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
32 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
33 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
34 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
35 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
36 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
37 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
38 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.50
39 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50
40 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.50
¥ 0.67 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.50
Bold numbers have been obtained from F12 or F22.Table 3: Copeland
n\m 3456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 ¥
3 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.67
4 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.50
5 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.60
6 1.00 0.82 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.33
7 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.56
8 0.91 0.73 0.63 0.57 0.52 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.25
9 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.50
10 0.86 0.68 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.20
11 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.47
12 0.82 0.65 0.55 0.49 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.17
13 0.74 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.44
14 0.80 0.63 0.53 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.14
15 0.73 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.43
16 0.78 0.61 0.51 0.45 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.13
17 0.72 0.64 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.42
18 0.77 0.60 0.50 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.11
19 0.71 0.64 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.41
20 0.76 0.59 0.49 0.42 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.10
21 0.71 0.63 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.40
22 0.75 0.58 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.09
23 0.71 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.39
24 0.74 0.57 0.47 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.08
25 0.70 0.63 0.56 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.39
26 0.74 0.57 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.08
27 0.70 0.63 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.38
28 0.73 0.56 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.07
29 0.70 0.63 0.55 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.38
30 0.73 0.56 0.46 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.07
31 0.70 0.62 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.38
32 0.72 0.56 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.06
33 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.38
34 0.72 0.55 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.06
35 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.37
36 0.72 0.55 0.45 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.06
37 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.37
38 0.71 0.55 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.05
39 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.37
40 0.71 0.54 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.05
¥ 0.67 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.33
¥ 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.00
Bold numbers are the same as the Condorcet numbers.Table 4: Kramer-Simson
n\m 3456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 ¥
3 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.67 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.00
4 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.76 0.62 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.00
5 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.00
6 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.63 0.74 0.73 0.63 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.00
7 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.54 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.00
8 0.91 0.79 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.47 0.67 0.64 0.54 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.00
9 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.42 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.44 0.40 0.00
10 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.38 0.63 0.55 0.48 0.42 0.00
11 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.34 0.57 0.51 0.45 0.00
12 0.82 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.32 0.55 0.48 0.00
13 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.29 0.51 0.00
14 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.27 0.00
15 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.00
16 0.78 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.57 0.49 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.00
17 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.49 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.00
18 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.49 0.43 0.42 0.52 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.00
19 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.55 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.00
20 0.76 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.51 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.48 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.00
21 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.54 0.43 0.38 0.36 0.50 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.00
22 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.52 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.00
23 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.45 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.46 0.40 0.36 0.00
24 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.50 0.47 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.00
25 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.50 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.43 0.37 0.00
26 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.00
27 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.40 0.00
28 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.00
29 0.70 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.00
30 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.51 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.00
31 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.00
32 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.51 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.00
33 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.00
34 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.00
35 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.41 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.00
36 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.44 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.00
37 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.45 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.00
38 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.51 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.00
39 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.40 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.00
40 0.71 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.00
¥ 0.67 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.00
The numbers in the upper-right corner and those in the limit column come from Theorem 26,
underlined numbers and those in the lower-right corner from Theorem 24, and bold numbers from
Theorem 25. All others are the same as the Condorcet numbers.Table 5: The majority matrix of profile P
31 for n =9
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